UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 16, 2025

Below, Prof. Willem Hoyng provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC.

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14 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Ona v Google

UPC_CFI_100/2024; 411/2024 

Bifurcation

Order by the Court

Already before the end of the written proceedings, the Court orders that it will not bifurcate.

Comment

I have already said before that I think that such an early decision as soon as a counterclaim for revocation is filed is desirable. It involves the Technically Qualified Judge from the start of the proceedings and can only make proceedings more efficient.

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Ona v Apple

UPC_CFI_99/2024; 392/2024

Same decision as Ona v Google above.

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Shanghai v Longi

UPC_CFI_119/2025 

Service

Facts

Defendants 1, 5, 6 were served.
Defendant 4 was informed by the German Post Office (after they were sent a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt which they did not accept) that they could pick up the documents for a period of two weeks but failed to do so.
For Defendants 2, 3 and 5 service is still outstanding.

Request

The claimant requested the Court to order that Defendant 4 (a German company) would be deemed validly served.

The Judge Rapporteur (JR)

Referring to R. 271.6.b RoP, the JR rules that Defendant 4 is validly served.

Comment

The German Patent Office stated that “the recipient has been notified”. What does that mean? I suspect that that is a simple card in the letterbox stating that the documents can be collected for a period of the upcoming 14 days. There is no guarantee that defendant 4 was actually aware or could have known (for instance because they refused receipt) that they have been sued. I have serious doubts whether that should be deemed a valid service.

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Maxeon Solar v Aiko

UPC_CFI_336/2024; 605/2024

Security of legal costs

Facts

There are 8 defendants in this case.
Defendant 1, 2 and 4 belong to the same group.
These defendants argue that claimant’s financial situation is bad and request a security payment of € 123,200 for legal costs.
The claimant argued that the claim was unfounded, and that even if it were founded, a security €60,000 would suffice.

The Court

  1. The Court ruled that defendants 1, 2, and 4 bear the burden of proof regarding the claimant’s alleged poor financial situation, and that the claimant would subsequently have to rebut that. In this case, defendants 1, 2, and 4 are correct.
  2. The Court furthermore held that the ceiling for recoverable costs is €200,000.
  3. The Court also noted that there are two groups of defendants (defendants 1, 2, 4 and defendants 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). Each group is entitled to claim with a ceiling of €100,000.
  4. Lastly, the Court stated that it should also take into account the claimant’s right to an effective remedy, and concluded that it is fair, reasonable, and proportionate to set the security at €100,000.

Comment

  1. A lot of time was spent by the full Court and the parties on a security for costs decision, while one party asked for €123,000 and the claimant, realizing its position was weak, offered €60,000. Why can the representatives not pick up the phone and settle this at
    €90,000? Why can the JR not send a message to both parties suggesting to settle at €90,000?
  2. Defendants 1, 2, and 4 did — if I read the decision correctly — not calculate the ceiling correctly. It would also have been wise to already request a default judgment (R. 355 RoP) in case the security was not provided in time.
  3. I count 8 defendants. There is no good explanation why the ceiling for defendants 1, 2, and 4 is 50% of €200,000. It should have been three-eighths (3/8) of €200,000 =
    €75,000.
  4. After stating that the ceiling is €100,000, the Court said it had to take into account the claimant’s right to an effective remedy, as well as fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, and then concluded — without stating that this had no effect on the ceiling — that the security should be €100,000.
  5. My conclusion: not very efficient, and not a very convincing decision by four judges!

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Headwater Research v Motorola cs and Flextronics

UPC_CFI_127/2024; 149/2024

Separation of proceedings

Facts

  1. Headwater requests to separate the proceedings against defendant Flextronics from the proceedings against Motorola c.s., and to order that Headwater does not have to pay new Court fees. Flextronics argues that application be rejected.
  2. The reason for the request is that the case has suffered substantial delay because a company that did not exist was served.

The Judge-Rapporteur (JR)

  1. The JR notes they have discretion to order separation of proceedings, taking into consideration the benefits for procedural efficiency and whether or not parties would be disadvantaged.
  2. The JR rules that in this case the proceedings against defendants 1–4 are much further advanced than those against defendant 5. However, the same questions arise for all defendants, so it is better to address them in the same case. Moreover, the delay was caused by the claimant itself, as it served a non-existent company.

Comment

  1. A logical decision. Before initiating proceedings, a representative should carefully verify the legal status of potential defendants to ensure that the correct (and existing!) company is sued.
  2. Defendant 5 was a Dutch company. What would have happened if the separation had been ordered? Would the Munich Division still have had jurisdiction? In my view, only if the Dutch company was also infringing in Germany, because jurisdiction could no longer be based on the fact that defendant 5 is a co-defendant.

 

14 April 2025
Court of Appeal, Stadapharm v Accord/Novartis

UPC_CoA_150/2025 

Public access to register

Facts

Stadapharm applied for access to the Statement of Claim for a DNI declaration, including 36 exhibits, filed by Accord against Novartis.
The Milan Local Division dismissed the request because Stadapharm had not demonstrated a legitimate interest during the proceedings.
Stadapharm appealed.
The Milan Central Division allowed withdrawal of the main case by Accord.
Both Accord and Novartis no longer objected to Stadapharm’s request.

Court of Appeal

Allowed the request.

Comment

The proceedings had ended. Therefore, unlike in first instance, no special interest was required to access the documents. The parties also no longer objected. A logical decision.

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Seoul Viosys v Expert Klein

UPC_CFI_363/2023; 677/2024

Cost proceedings

Background

Seoul won the infringement proceedings and initiated cost proceedings.
During oral argument, the parties had agreed on €100,000 in costs for the prevailing party. However, they later disagreed on whether this included court costs (€11,000), travel expenses, and the cost of a test purchase!

Decision of the Court

The Court decided that the €100,000 covered representation only. The Court therefore also awarded the additional costs.

Comment

  1. I have often advocated that parties should agree on costs. Here we finally see German representatives doing so — and it goes wrong because they are not used to it! If you make a cost agreement, be clear that it covers all costs the winner can claim!
  2. If, as here, such an agreement is made during oral argument, the presiding judge should ensure both parties understand what they are agreeing to.
  3. Ideally, the agreement is made a few days before oral argument. The representatives know what they’ve spent on representation and can reasonably estimate remaining costs. They know the court fees and what they’ve spent on travel — and even pizza (for late nights).
  4. By the way, if you claim the cost of pizza (I’ve seen that), then you must deduct the savings from not eating a meal at home!

 

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Edwards v Meril

UPC_CFI_501/2023 

Notice of enforcement

Background

Edwards won infringement proceedings against Meril.

Request

Edwards seeks to enforce the decision and notifies the Court.
It requests an authentic paper copy of the decision in accordance with R. 118.8 RoP.
Meril confirms that no translation is necessary.

JR

Orders the Registry to issue an authentic paper copy of the decision.

Comment

  1. A decision is only enforceable after the claimant notifies the Court which parts of the order it wants to enforce and supplies a certified translation into the language of the Contracting Member State where enforcement is sought. The Registry must then serve the certified translation on the defendants.
  2. In this case, the parties apparently agreed on compliance, and the claimant requested only an authentic paper copy.
  3. Note that, in my view, a defendant can still request security at this stage if the decision is not final (e.g., in PI proceedings or a first instance decision that can still be or has been appealed). See the last sentence of R. 118.8 RoP.

 

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Syngenta v Sumi Agro

UPC_CFI_566/2024; 39/2025 

International jurisdiction

Request

The claimant applies to amend their claim and to include Poland, the UK, and the Czech Republic.

JR

The JR allows the request as Syngenta could not have made these requests before the decision by the Court of Justice of the EU (”CJEU”) in BSH v Electrolux and because Sumi Agro will have enough time to react in the written proceedings. The JR sets the dates for the interim conference and the oral hearing and amends the time schedule for further submissions.

Comment

  1. Although already in 2022 during the training of the judges Pierre Veron and I said that the UPC had jurisdiction for such cases and claimants (such as Fuji – see Fuji v. Kodak –) already had included non-UPC countries in their Statement of Claim, I can only applaud the fact that now after CJEU BSH v Electrolux there seems to be a realization that at least for companies established in the UPC-area, the UPC is the Court to go to for dealing with European Patents for all countries where the European patent has been validated.
  2. As in the majority of cases against defendants established in the UPC also infringement and validity in the UPC has to be dealt with, the task of the Court to deal with these non-UPC countries is in general not difficult. All these countries are signatories of the European Patent Convention (EPC), which means (see Art. 2(2) EPC) that infringement (Art. 69 and the Protocol) and validity (Art. 138) also govern infringement and validity in these countries. Except if a defendant is able to prove that the case law in such a non-UPC country is different from the UPC, the Court can give the same judgment for such countries as for the UPC. For EU countries (and because of comity, I would do the same for non-EU countries), I suggest giving (in case invalidity is raised) a conditional judgment that the patent is not held totally or partially invalid by a final decision of the competent (national) court.
  3. It remains to be seen if CJEU BSH v Electrolux is also applicable to co-defendants. In my view, that question could certainly be answered positively for co-defendants who have their residence in the EU, as comity aspects do not play a role there. If I am right, then that would be an even stronger argument for EU countries that have not yet joined the UPC to do so, as this would mean that the UPC (as an example) could not only grant an injunction against UPC companies not to infringe in Spain but also grant such injunctions against Spanish companies sued as co-defendants in UPC proceedings.
  4. Are there ways for third parties to avoid such wide jurisdiction for the UPC? Yes, there are, but they are complicated and expensive, and a clever claimant can neutralize them. It would require a much longer comment to discuss all that.

 

14 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Seoul v Expert (EP 3 223 320)

UPC_CFI_483/2023; 823/2024; 824/2024 

1 day late

Background

In this case, Expert won because the patent was revoked. Expert wanted to recover its costs and started cost proceedings on 12 December 2024, while the decision was issued on 10 October 2024.

Decision of the JR

  1. The claim is dismissed as being one day late.
  2. The argument that the decision was only uploaded in the infringement workflow is dismissed.
  3. The argument that problems with the CMS prevented uploading the Statement of Claim in the cost proceedings is no excuse, as a hard copy could have been filed at the Registry.

Comment

  1. A strong warning for representatives. You have to know the Rules, and you have to have an in-house system to alert you to deadlines. The first thing you must do after a victory is not to drink champagne, but to enter in your agenda: after three weeks “cost procedure” and again after 28 days “cost procedure!!”.
  2. The excuse that the CMS did not work was not good enough, as you can file a hard copy. However, it shows that you should not wait until the last hour, because if the CMS does not work, you have to lodge your hard copy at the (sub) Registry. I assume (but do not guarantee) that sending an electronic copy to the Registry by email would be OK if you are no longer able to deliver a hard copy in time. So, all representatives should make sure they have the email address of the (sub) Registry. I would send it to that address, stating that it is for the attention of the Registry, mentioning the times you tried unsuccessfully to upload, and stating that you cannot deliver a hard copy to the Registry in time. I assume that the (sub) Registry is closed in the evening. If you reach the (sub) Registry in time but find it closed, make sure there is a witness and make a video of yourself putting your statement in the mailbox, showing the time. Again, this is all risky business, and you are better off not waiting until the last minute.

 

16 April 2025
Local Division Mannheim, Dish v Aylo

UPC_CFI_471/2023

Further written submission

Background

Defendant requests to be allowed to file a further submission because in US proceedings concerning a related patent, the claimant gave a completely different meaning to two claim elements, which confirms what the defendant stated in its Reply.

The JR

  1. The JR refuses the request.
  2. The JR repeats the criteria for a further submission: the Court has to take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the interests of the parties, and the interest of the Court in maintaining an orderly procedure. It is especially important whether the requestor could have made the statement earlier. It is up to the requestor to provide arguments for accepting the request.
  3. In this case, these considerations lead to the following:
    a. The fact that a party gives a different claim interpretation in other proceedings is irrelevant, as a different interpretation in another case is not relevant for claim interpretation.
    b. Defendants have not made clear that they could not have made this argument earlier.

Comment

  1. Again (we have seen it before), this decision shows how important it is to have good coordination in international patent litigation. If you are a representative, you should ask your client whether the same or similar litigation is ongoing in the US or other non-UPC countries (or national proceedings), and ensure you know what is being said in those proceedings by both the other party and your own client with respect to claim interpretation.
  2. The JR is technically right that what has been said in different litigation is not a means of claim interpretation. However, in practice, that is not (always) the way it works. If both parties defend different, yet plausible, claim interpretations, your defence is clearly less credible if, in proceedings concerning the same invention (a patent of the same family), you give — without good reason — the interpretation defended by the other party.
  3. If the JR says this is all irrelevant and not admitted, why does he then describes in detail what is not admitted? He should have simply refused the request with a brief sentence. Now the three other judges also know about it, and in fact, the defendant has reached their goal: it is not officially in the proceedings, but all judges know, and the claimant cannot say anything about it.
  4. Such a decision will trigger every representative who wants to raise an argument after the last written statement of the other side to file a request for a further written submission — and to describe the new argument in full detail in that request.
  5. Of course, I am not a judge, and judges tell me that such inadmissible statements in no way influence their judgment. I want to believe them — but judges are (fortunately) also human beings!
  6. Conclusion: if I had been the JR (which I am not, and am not qualified for), I would have decided as follows: “I note that you lodged a request which is in fact a further written statement in disguise for which you did not obtain permission. So your ‘request’ is ignored and, insofar as necessary, dismissed.”

 

16 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Bekaert v Siltronic

UPC_CFI_539/2024 

Evidentiary seizure

Background

Bekaert holds a patent for a saw wire (to cut wafers). It has found evidence that Seltronic uses such saw wires.
The evidentiary seizure has taken place. Seltronic asks the Court to review the order and to revoke it (R. 197 RoP) or to make changes to it.

The case

Seltronic basically argues that the seizure was unnecessary because Bekaert already had a saw wire or could have bought one. There was no risk that invoices, customs documents, etc. would be destroyed, because as a company listed on the stock market, Seltronic was obliged to keep such documents for 10 years.

The Court

The Court refuses review after considering that the seizure was justified to establish infringement and the different infringing acts. Also, measures not specifically mentioned in R. 196.1 RoP can be ordered and can include the physical seizure of documents and invoices.

Comment

  1. The Court is right: what can be done and seized during an evidentiary seizure is not restricted to the measures mentioned in R. 196.1 RoP. That becomes clear from the text: “The Court may order, in particular, the following …”.
  2. As I have said earlier, such seizures almost always take place ex parte and R. 197.1 RoP (which is based on the Enforcement Directive) is in fact a dead letter. That paragraph requires the risk of “irreparable harm” or “a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed or otherwise ceasing to be available”.
  3. On the other hand, nothing can go wrong if the evidentiary seizure is done properly and is conducted as in Düsseldorf, because no confidential information will go to the applicant, assuming that all representatives present on behalf of the applicant will not disclose anything.
  4. Nevertheless, it remains an invasive means of collecting evidence, which should not (as customary in France, for instance) be used as the standard start of infringement proceedings. In this case, the same information could have been obtained through orders to produce evidence and/or to communicate information.

 

 

16 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Emboline v AorticLab

UPC_CFI_628/2024

Security for costs

Facts

The applicant asks for security for costs, as the defendant has stated that an injunction would mean insolvency.

Judge Rapporteur

  1. Whether Art. 69(4) UPCA (which states that the defendant can ask for costs) also allows the claimant to ask for costs does not have to be decided, because the defendant is claimant in the counterclaim for invalidity.
  2. The JR grants the requested security of €200,000.

Comment

  1. Is a defendant also a claimant in the sense of Art. 69(4) UPCA when they are sued by a company and are forced to defend himself with a counterclaim for invalidity because under the Rules of Procedure they cannot simply invoke invalidity as an inter partes defence? Are they not de facto a defendant?
  2. The JR cites only a part of the case law of the Court of Appeal (“likelihood that the claimant cannot pay the costs”) but says nothing with respect to “access to justice” — and in this case, the defendant’s right to defend themselves (Art. 6 of the Treaty of Strasbourg). It is, in my opinion, totally unacceptable if, by imposing security on a defendant, the defendant is confronted with a default judgment only because they cannot provide the required security.
  3. All this means that the defendant’s statement that an injunction would mean bankruptcy is, in fact, a reason not to impose security. In this case, the defendant states that in the meantime it raised money — but that argument is not used by the JR to justify that the defendant can easily provide a security of €200,000.
  4. If the JR states that in the cross-complaint for invalidity the defendant is the claimant and therefore security can be ordered, then I cannot follow why they ordered the full amount requested (which was for the whole case). They should then have awarded half of the requested amount as security for the counterclaim proceedings, i.e. €100,000.
  5. The JR also does not respond to the argument that in the meantime the defendant raised new capital of €10 million. So it was clearly good for its money.
  6. I sense from this decision a division that is overloaded with cases and cannot spend much time on these (continuous) security for costs demands. Again, it would be much better for a healthy UPC if cases were better spread across the different divisions. If representatives keep filing in the same divisions and this behaviour is not changed voluntarily, the UPCA should, in my opinion, ultimately be amended (see Art. 87 UPCA) to give the President of the Court of First Instance (CFI) the power to refer cases to different divisions in order to better balance the workload.

 

16 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Heraeus v Vibrantz

UPC_CFI_114/2024; 448/2024

Deadlines

Background/Decision

In this case there is confusion about the date on which the one-month term for the rejoinder starts. The JR looks in the CMS and notes when the representatives and the confidentiality club had access to the full text of the reply, and decides that the start of the term for the rejoinder is 18 March for the claimant, and for the defendant’s reply 22 April, and that the written phase ends on 22 May.

Comment

The claimant had asked for a start date of 22 April, citing local festivities in the place where the representatives work, the long Easter weekend, and vacation. These representatives had not realised that the old times are over — and that if you choose to be a representative before the UPC, you sometimes have to work on weekends, during Easter, and during vacations. The UPC wants decisions within 12–14 months!

 

17 April 2025
Local Division Düsseldorf, Atlas v Vantiva

UPC_CFI_407/2024 

Request for stay

Facts

Parties request a stay of the proceedings.

Decision of the full panel

Stay granted.

Comment

Parties should give good reasons for a stay. The Court does not automatically have to agree to a stay just because both parties ask for it!

 

17 April 2025
Local Division Munich, Promosone v BioNTech, Pfizer

UPC_CFI_846/2024

Preliminary objection

Facts

Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the UPC for the product Comirnaty Original / Omicron BA.1, as that variant (of the allegedly infringing vaccines) was only manufactured and sold prior to 1 June 2023.

Decision of the JR

The JR says the Court will deal with it in the main proceedings. The JR, as a provisional opinion, sides with the decisions of Local Divisions which state that when there is “continuing” infringement, the UPC also has jurisdiction with respect to infringements committed before 1 June 2023.
The JR notes that a case is pending in the Court of Appeal and prefers to wait for that decision.

Comment

  1. As this does not lead to delay, it is indeed wise to wait for the decision of the Court of Appeal.
  2. I agree with the decisions which state that when there is an ongoing infringement, the UPC can also deal with the past. The question is: what is ongoing? I think that if you use the same allegedly infringing method to make a different vaccine, that would be ongoing.
  3. The next question: what law do you have to apply? I think that for the past you will have to apply national law, otherwise the UPC would indeed have retroactive effect. The fact that now another court (the UPC) is competent also with respect to past infringement is, in my opinion, not retroactive effect. The question is therefore whether national law (which also applies Art. 69 EPC and Art. 138 EPC) is different. That is up to the defendant to prove.

 

17 April 2025
Court of Appeal, Kodak v Fuji

UPC_CoA_312/2025;325/2025 

Uncontested facts and suspensive effect

Background

On 2 April 2025, the Local Division Mannheim granted an injunction to Fuji because of infringement by Kodak. Kodak appealed and requested suspensive effect.

Court of Appeal

  1. An appeal has no suspensive effect. The Court of Appeal will only grant suspensive effect if the appellant’s interest in maintaining the status quo exceptionally outweighs the respondent’s interest — for instance, if the decision is manifestly wrong or if the appeal, without suspensive effect, would become devoid of purpose.
  2. Kodak has failed to show that the factual findings or legal considerations are manifestly wrong.
  3. Kodak gives an incorrect interpretation of the principle that a fact not contested must be held as true. Kodak thinks that this also means that the legal consequences argued on the basis of such a fact must be accepted as correct. That is incorrect — it is for the Court to judge what the correct legal consequence is.
  4. The Court of Appeal rejects the request for suspensive effect.

Comment

  1. Under point 1, the Court of Appeal repeats its case law, from which Kodak should, in my opinion, have understood that its request had no merit.
  2. The Court of Appeal further explains a principle (ius curia novit) that everyone with a law degree should know: it is the court that applies the law. So even if the other party does not contest a wrong application of the law, the court will not apply that incorrect interpretation.

 

17 April 2025
Local Division The Hague, Genevant v Moderna

UPC_CFI_191/2025;192/2025 

Extensions of deadlines

Background

Genevant sues numerous Moderna companies in two proceedings.
Moderna is not willing to cooperate in agreeing on one address for service and tries to make service as difficult as possible. This results in various dates of service.
Moderna then asks for an extension of time for the Preliminary Objection and for the Statement of Defence.
It is also clear that the CMS is inadequate to accommodate all of this.

The Judge-Rapporteur

The JR does not grant any extension for the Preliminary Objections, arguing that these objections concern jurisdictional questions that differ between the defendants.
The JR grants a limited extension for the Statement of Defence, citing that the UPC aims to issue decisions within 12–14 months.
The JR further informs Moderna that the Court would like to receive, as far as possible, one document dealing with the Preliminary Objections and one document with the Statement of Defence.

Comment

All very practical and fair decisions. The JR is unsympathetic to all Moderna’s complaints about workload and the need for more time — and rightly so, given Moderna’s rather obstructive attitude.

 

 

17 April 2025
Court of Appeal, Barco v Yealink

UPC_CoA_329/2025 

Suspensive effect

Background

On 21 March 2025, the Local Division Brussels dismissed a request for a PI due to lack of urgency. Barco appealed and asked for suspensive effect regarding the cost order.

The Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal applies its case law and states that Barco has failed to demonstrate a manifest error.

Comment

  1. The decision of the Court of Appeal is understandable.
  2. The decision on costs is, in my view, clear and not manifestly wrong.
  3. What is wrong — as I commented in Unfiltered week 14 — is the decision on urgency. Although it probably does not rise to the level of being manifestly wrong, it would at least have offered a better basis for arguing that suspensive effect for the cost order should be granted.
  4. Barco is afraid of the cost decision because Yealink claims that the Brussels Division has already awarded costs.
  5. I understand that the Brussels Division “ordered Barco to bear reasonable and proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by Yealink up to the applicable ceiling of €112,000” (emphasis mine). That is not an enforceable cost decision. The amount of costs must first be determined in cost proceedings.

 

18 April 2025
Central Division Munich, Kunststoff Nehl v Häfele

UPC_CFI_526/2024

Auxiliary requests

Background

In revocation proceedings, the patentee files 80 auxiliary requests.
The claimant submits that the application is inadmissible and unfounded.

Management order by the Judge-Rapporteur

The JR (after consultation with the panel) issues the following order the day after the last written submission:

  1. The value of the proceedings (as stated by the claimant and uncontested by the defendant) is €500k, which means a ceiling for recoverable costs of €56,000.
  2. Parties may submit a preliminary estimate of legal costs before the oral hearing but are encouraged to reach an agreement on costs.
  3. 80 auxiliary requests is not a reasonable number. There is also no clear structure or hierarchy, which makes the task for the claimant and the Court unduly difficult.
  4. The defendant is given the opportunity to reduce the auxiliary requests to 10.
  5. New inventive step attacks in the reply to the defence to the counterclaim for revocation, based on a document already in the proceedings, are contrary to the frontloaded character of the proceedings (leaving aside whether this also constitutes an amendment of the case).
  6. In the last written statement (the Rejoinder), a party may only respond to the content of the previous pleading.
  7. The JR will set a date for an informal settlement discussion if both parties express interest by email to the Registry.

Comment

Lessons for representatives:

  1. We are not at the EPO. 80 unstructured auxiliary requests is not reasonable.
  2. A new invalidity attack based on a document you already knew at the start of proceedings is (of course) not going to be accepted. If you have good reasons for late filing then you should file for permission to amend your case.
  3. You cannot bring new arguments in your last written statement.
  4. In general: you cannot proceed as if you were before the Bundespatentgericht (except that you must use English).
  5. Again, the JR (Judge Kupecz) wisely suggests agreeing on costs before the oral hearing.
  6. The JR offers to facilitate a settlement discussion, citing all the advantages for clients. Let’s see whether the representatives advise their clients to accept the invitation and whether the JR is successful. If you know the Rules, you know this is one of the goals of the interim conference. But we see that the (too) busy local divisions often lack the time to properly pursue settlement.

 

18 April 2025
Court of Appeal, Meril v Edwards

UPC_CoA_166/2024 

Application for suspensive effect

Background

  1. The Central Division in Paris, handling a revocation action and a counterclaim for revocation from the Munich Division, maintained the patent in amended form.
  2. Thereafter, the Local Division Munich issued an injunction.
  3. Meril appealed.
  4. Meril now requests suspensive effect or a stay of enforcement.

Arguments

  1. The scope of the injunction is unclear.
  2. The decision is manifestly erroneous.
  3. Edwards’ right to publish the decision would render the appeal meaningless if not suspended.
  4. Meril’s interests outweigh those of Edwards.

The Court of Appeal

Rejects the request.

Comment

  1. A logical decision! If you read the request and know your case law, you immediately realise it is not going to be granted.
  2. Edwards did the right thing by stating that it would not publish the judgment before a decision on appeal — which immediately removed the argument that suspensive effect should be granted because the appeal would otherwise be without purpose.

 

18 April 2025
Court of Appeal, Scandit v Handheld

UPC_CoA_520/2024 

Return of court fees

Background

On 27 August 2024, the Local Division Munich granted a preliminary injunction against Scandit.
Scandit appealed.
After the appeal proceedings, including an oral hearing, the parties settled.

Request Scandit

Scandit now requests the return of 20% of the court fees, arguing that the oral procedure ends with the judgment — and since no judgment was issued, they are entitled to a refund.

Court of Appeal

Rejects the application with sophisticated reasoning!

Comment

  1. I applaud the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had completed all the work, including preparation and the oral hearing.
  2. You really wonder why Scandit made this request. It’s peanuts compared to their total costs. They may have spent more on lawyers’ fees to file this request than the 20% court fee they sought to recover. More seriously, it wasted the time of the Court of Appeal.

 

– All comments above are Prof. Hoyng‘s personal opinions –

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For all decisions of the UPC’s Court of Appeal from the start in 2023 until 1 January 2025, Willem Hoyng’s more comprehensive summaries and comments are bundled in the book Case law – Court of Appeal of the UPC 2023-2024.